The same would have been true of Leibniz, of Cudworth and of Samuel Clarke in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is a conviction which was explicitly acknowledged by the vast majority of Christian and non- Christian philosophers from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries; and, I believe, shared, although acknowledged less explic-itly, by many Christian and non-Christian philosophers from the first to the twelfth century. It accepts that our justified beliefs can all be divided into the two great classes, basic and derived; that our derived beliefs are justified only if they are supported by our properly basic beliefs, directly or indi-rectly; and that all the beliefs described by classical foundationalism as properly basic are indeed properly basic. I believe that Mary is a better swimmer than Fred because I also believe that when they have competed against each other Mary has been able to swim further and faster than Fred, and I have inferred the first belief from the second. Second, if someone does arrive at their beliefs by wishful thinking, they have by definition not arrived at those beliefs by good reasoning. The first conception is portrayed in Figure 1. But now the Great Pumpkin objection must return.
Previous reviews have had the philosophical approach that I am not enough prepared to discuss. It is the mere occurrence of the pain itself which grounds and hence justifies my belief that I am in pain. All we need is a working definition which can allow the debate to begin. Plantinga now undertakes to show that classical foundationalism is untenable, and that we therefore have no good reason to require theism to be based on evidence. And it is this fact which is seized upon by the third kind of sceptic whom we distinguished above.
But that is not what Plantinga is saying. By contrast, the grounds of a belief are never further beliefs from which one reasons but simply experiences; and one does not reason from the experience to the belief, it is the mere occurrence of the experience which supplies at least prima facie justification for the belief. First, writing at an elementary level was too restrictive. As an example, take my belief that I remember having toast for break-fast this morning. Since it is neither obviously true that he exists, nor obviously true that he does not, we need to examine what reasons there are to think that he exists, what reasons there are to think that he does not, to weigh them against each other, and thereby come to the most reasonable view we can. But you cannot threaten the truth of a claim merely by showing that those who accept the claim have engaged in wishful thinking.
They have thought that a good argument could be constructed to show that anyone who recognised moral constraints as genuinely binding was logically committed to the existence of God; and we will be looking at their position in Chapter 7. All links from this site were collected in an automatic manner and can not be recognized as affiliated with our site. No one can be compelled to think them true, to believe in them. If not, what are the criteria for being properly basic, and what grounds are there for saying that theism meets these criteria? The crucial distinction is that rea-sons for a belief B have to take the form of further beliefs from which one reasons to B as a conclusion. So, although there is a defeater to my original memory belief, I have a defeater for that defeater, and for this reason I can retain the original belief not merely as basic, but as properly basic.
But this has no direct bearing on the question we are going to consider. But already, according to some thinkers, we have gone wrong. He is eternal, and omnipresent; and he is without bodily parts. That is, we are doing the same thing as Google, only within the framework of one subject. But how can such a position be defended? I might hold one belief A on the basis of another belief B; hold B on the basis of belief C; and so on.
Presumably people can be mistaken in thinking that God has revealed himself to them. Dispatch time is 4-5 working days from our warehouse. On the other hand are the arguments against theistic belief: the traditional problem of evil; the logical tensions between divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience and eternity; and arguments from the scale of the universe. Supplemental Materials What is included with this book? In working on the book, I have come to abandon all of those early aims. Best of all, if after reading an e-book, you buy a paper version of Non-Existence of God.
But it will not cover religions such as Hinduism, or Bud-dhism, or Jainism which are not monotheistic. She is claiming: A A belief that p is justified only if p is properly basic i. Second, the book has become avowedly more partisan. Where does a belief in God fit into this picture of the structure of our jus-tified beliefs? But nor can I derive it from any of my basic beliefs. I am then no longer entitled to hold on to my memory belief.
But this is a purely pragmatic policy: there may well be cogent arguments which believers and disbelievers alike have overlooked. Let us look in more detail at these three kinds of reservation about a search for reasons. Suppose that we decide that there are no good grounds for believing in the existence of God. So either A is false, or if it is true, no rational person could believe it. From what has already been said, we can see that this does not mean that everyone, everywhere, at every time is right, rational etc.